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ARTICLE 45-EVIDENCE
CPLR 4513: Sandoval held inapplicable to civil actions.
With its decision in People v. Sandoval,49 the Court of Appeals
recognized the broad discretion of a trial court to determine whether
a prior conviction may be admitted under CPL 60.40(1)50 for the
purpose of impeaching the credibility of a criminal defendant.5 ' The
Sandoval court was of the opinion that such discretion must be
accident and had never filed a change of address form with the Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles. Id. at 731, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 31. In Kenworthy v. Van Zandt, 71 Misc. 2d 950, 337
N.Y.S.2d 481 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1972) the court held service under CPLR 308(5)
to be proper where defendant told plaintiff's counsel that he would be home at a designated
time to accept service and then left a letter saying he had moved to Tennessee. Id. at 954,
337 N.Y.S.2d at 484. See also Buscher v. Ehrich, 12 App. Div. 2d 887, 209 N.Y.S.2d 941 (4th
Dep't 1961)(mem.); Levine v. National Transp. Co., 204 Misc. 202, 125 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County), aff'd mem., 282 App. Div. 720, 122 N.Y.S.2d 901 (2d Dep't 1953).
" 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1974). In Sandoval, defendant, who
had been indicted for common law murder, made a pretrial motion requesting the trial court
to prohibit the use of evidence concerning past criminal convictions to impeach his credibil-
ity. The trial judge, while ruling that two of the convictions were admissible, prohibited the
introduction of several other convictions, finding that their potential for unfair prejudice
outweighed their probative value on the credibility issue. Id. at 373, 314 N.E.2d at 415, 357
N.Y.S.2d at 852. In affirming the lower court's holding, the Court of Appeals noted that
although CPL 60.40 permits admission of past criminal convictions, it does not address the
question of "when and to what extent a defendant may be cross-examined concerning prior
convictions." Id. at 374, 314 N.E.2d at 416, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 853 (quoting CPL § 60.40,
commentary at 256 (McKinney 1971)). The Court pointed out that in the absence of legisla-
tion the trial judge has always possessed discretionary authority concerning the "nature and
extent of cross-examination." 34 N.Y.2d at 374, 314 N.E.2d at 416, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
Reasoning that the purpose of proving criminal convictions on cross-examination of a defen-
dant is to impeach credibility, the Court of Appeals concluded that such evidence should be
utilized only if its probative value on the question of credibility outweighs its prejudicial
impact upon the defendant. Id. at 378, 314 N.E.2d at 418, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 856. In assessing
the conviction's tendency to discredit the defendant, a trial court must take into account both
the nature of the underlying criminal act and the lapse of time since its occurrence. Id. at
376, 314 N.E.2d at 417, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
° CPL § 60.40(1) states:
If in the course of a criminal proceeding, any witness, including a defendant,
is properly asked whether he was previously convicted of a specified offense and
answers in the negative or in an equivocal manner, the party adverse to the one
who called him may independently prove such conviction. If in response to proper
inquiry whether he has ever been convicted of any offense the witness answers in
the negative or in an equivocal manner, the adverse party may independently prove
any previous conviction of the witness.
" 34 N.Y.2d at 374, 314 N.E.2d at 416, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 853. Prior to the ruling in
Sandoval, the lower courts were in disagreement concerning whether CPL 60.40(1) abrogated
the judiciary's discretion to determine the admissibility of prior convictions in criminal pro-
ceedings. Compare People v. Pritchett, 69 Misc. 2d 67, 329 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1972), with People v. King, 72 Misc. 2d 540, 339 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1972). For a discussion of the right to impeach a witness in a criminal proceeding,
including an analysis of Sandoval, see Note, The Dilemma of a Defendant Witness in New
York: The Impeachment Problem Half-Solved, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 129 (1975).
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vested in the trial judge to protect against the introduction of a
conviction whose prejudicial impact upon the defendant oversha-
dows its impeachment value.12 Recently, in Guarisco v. E.J. Milk
Farms,53 the Civil Court, Queens County, found the Sandoval prin-
ciple inapplicable to civil actions, holding that CPLR 4513,11 which
authorizes the use of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes
in civil proceedings, grants opposing counsel the absolute right to
question a witness about, or offer proof of, past convictions.15
Plaintiff Guarisco had been arrested and charged with shoplift-
ing in the E.J. Milk Farms store." The criminal action was later
dismissed, whereupon plaintiff instituted a suit against defendants
E.J. Milk Farms and the City of New York for false arrest, false
imprisonment, assault, and malicious prosecution.5 7 At a pretrial
examination, plaintiff was advised by his attorney not to answer a
question concerning a prior criminal conviction until a judicial de-
termination of the propriety of the inquiry." Contending that the
admission of his 20-year-old conviction would be unfairly prejudi-
cial,5" plaintiff moved for an order restraining defendants from ques-
tioning plaintiff or offering proof at trial with respect to the convic-
tion. 0 In ruling on plaintiff's motion, Judge Cohen noted the general
52 34 N.Y.2d at 375, 314 N.E.2d at 416, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 853-54. There was a concomitant
concern that a defendant's fear of being prejudiced by the introduction of prior convictions
would deter him from testifying, thereby adversely affecting the validity of the fact-finding
process. Id. at 378, 314 N.E.2d at 418, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
, 90 Misc. 2d 81, 393 N.Y.S.2d 883 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1977).
51 CPLR 4513 provides:
A person who has been convicted of a crime is a competent witness; but the
conviction may be proved, for the purpose of affecting the weight of his testimony,
either by cross-examination, upon which he shall be required to answer any relevant
question, or by the record. The party cross-examining is not concluded by such
person's answer.
This statute is a reenactment of CPA 350 without substantive change. SIXTH REP. 401.
' 90 Misc. 2d at 82-84, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 884-85.
' Affirmation in Support of Motion to Restrain Introduction of Evidence, Feb. 2, 1977,
at 1-2, Guarisco v. E.J. Milk Farms, 90 Misc. 2d 81, 393 N.Y.S.2d 883 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
Queens County 1977) [hereinafter cited as Affirmation].
' Affirmation, supra note 56, at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id.
CO Id. at 1. The nature of the conviction was not disclosed to the court. 90 Misc. 2d at
85, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 886. Plaintiff argued that since he was only 20 years old at the time of
his only criminal conviction, the conviction should be considered irrelevant to the current
litigation. Affirmation, supra note 56, at 2.
The issue whether a defendant may be questioned about prior convictions during pretrial
discovery was addressed in Counihan v. Knoebel, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 21, 1973, at 20, col. 7 (Sup.
Ct. Suffolk County). Counihan was a negligence action arising out of an automobile accident.
At the examination before trial defendant was asked if he had ever been convicted of driving
while intoxicated. Plaintiff contended that this information was needed for purposes of im-
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discretionary power of a trial court "to exclude evidence more preju-
dicial than probative,"'" but pointed out that such power was lim-
ited in a civil action by CPLR 4513.12 Although section 4513 allows
a convicted person to be a competent witness, it provides that such
person's conviction "may be proved, for the purpose of affecting the
weight of his testimony, either by cross-examination . . . or by the
record." 3 The court found that this statutory language left no room
for the exercise of discretion by a trial court.64 Judge Cohen con-
trasted the language of CPLR 4513 with CPL 60.40(1), which au-
thorizes an adverse party in a criminal action to introduce indepen-
dent evidence of a witness' prior conviction where the witness "is
properly asked whether he was previously convicted of a specified
offense" and replies in the negative or equivocates.15 Finding that
the word "properly" affords a criminal court discretion to limit the
scope of inquiry under CPL 60.40(1), the Guarisco court reasoned
that the absence of similar language in CPLR 4513 precludes the
exercise of judicial discretion in a civil action.6 Judge Cohen went
peaching the defendant's credibility. The court held that defendant was not obliged to answer
the question, reasoning that the examination before trial serves only to reveal facts placed in
issue by the pleadings, and that evidence relating to credibility is not within this category.
Id.
61 90 Misc. 2d at 82, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
62 Id.
" CPLR 4513 (emphasis added), quoted in note 54 supra.
" 90 Misc. 2d at 82-84, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 884-86 (citing Del Cerro v. City of New York, 46
App. Div. 2d 898, 361 N.Y.S.2d 707 (2d Dep't 1974) (mei.)). In Del Cerro, the second
department, without referring to CPLR 4513, held that the trial court had erred in excluding
evidence concerning the underlying facts of a witness' prior convictions. Id. at 899, 361
N.Y.S.2d at 709. It is unclear whether the appellate division believed that the trial judge had
no discretion to exclude evidence of a prior conviction or that the trial court had abused that
discretion which does exist. Similarly, in Moore v. Leventhal, 303 N.Y. 534, 104 N.E.2d 892
(1952), a negligence action arising from a motor vehicle accident, defense counsel asked
plaintiff if he was ever convicted of a crime and plaintiff answered affirmatively. Id. at 538,
104 N.E.2d at 894. When defense counsel continued this line of questioning by inquiring
whether plaintiff had been convicted of a specific crime, an objection was sustained on the
ground that plaintiff had admitted being convicted of a crime and any further questions
would not be relevant to credibility. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed, stating: "We do not
think an admission by a witness under cross-examination that he has been convicted of a
crime serves to deprive the cross-examiner of the right to show the conviction. The scope of
such inquiry, as defined by section 350 of the Civil Practice Act is not so limited." Id. It is
suggested that neither Moore nor Del Cerro restricts the discretion of a trial judge to exclude
unfairly prejudicial evidence of prior convictions. The Moore holding seems to be premised
upon the portion of CPA 350 which provided that a witness being cross-examined about a
past conviction admissible under the section "must answer any question relevant to that
inquiry." In Del Cerro, which arose after the similarly worded CPLR 4513 came into effect,
the appellate division relied on Moore as authority for its decision. These two cases do not
appear to treat the question whether a trial court, in its discretion, may refuse to admit all
proof of a particular conviction.
," CPL § 60.40(1) (emphasis added), quoted in note 50 supra.
66 90 Misc. 2d at 83, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
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on to intimate that the policy considerations underlying the
Sandoval decision are inapplicable to civil cases since a party stands
to lose little from attacks upon his credibility." Consequently, the
court concluded, a defendant in a civil suit may be impeached by
prior convictions without restriction."
The Guarisco court's conclusion seems contrary to the weight
of existing authority. Indeed, Judge Cohen appears to have over-
looked the decision of the Supreme Court, New York County, in
People v. McCleaver.69 The McCleaver court, presented with an
opportunity to construe CPLR 4513,70 determined that the statute
does not abrogate the common law discretion of a trial judge with
respect to the scope of cross-examination." Support for the
McCleaver position may be gleaned from the decisional law of other
jurisdictions which have enacted statutes similar in language to
CPLR 4513.2
Id. at 83-84, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
' Id. at 82, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
78 Misc. 2d 48, 354 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Sup. CtTNN County 1974).
Although McCleaver was a criminal action governed by the CPL, the court found that
CPL 60.40(1) deals with the method of proving, and not the admissibility of, prior convic-
tions. Finding no other relevant CPL provision, Justice Polsky invoked CPLR 4513 as the
touchstone of admissibility. In so doing, the court was following the mandate of CPL 60.10,
which states that "[u]nless otherwise provided by statute or by judicially established rules
of evidence applicable to criminal cases, the rules of evidence applicable to civil cases are,
where appropriate, also applicable to criminal proceedings."
1, Justice Polsky noted that an interpretation of CPLR 4513 which permits judicial
discretion in determining the admissibility of prior convictions is in "conformity with the
common-law authority of a court to restrict testimony to subjects relevant and material to
the issues on trial and even to exclude competent evidence where its prejudicial impact far
outweighs its relevance or materiality." 78 Misc. 2d at 50, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 849. It has long
been established that a trial judge has control over the extent and nature of cross-
examination. See Langley v. Wadsworth, 99 N.Y. 61, 1 N.E. 106 (1885); McQuage v. City of
New York, 285 App. Div. 249, 136 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1st Dep't 1954). See also People v. Sumpter,
75 Misc. 2d 55, 347 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1973). The Sumpter court recog-
nized that the judiciary has discretion over the introduction of prior convictions in criminal
proceedings. By way of dictum, the court stated that "[a]lthough [the] . . . authorities
[permitting discretion] deal principally with [the impact of] prior convictions . . . [upon]
the rights of defendants in criminal prosecutions, the same considerations should apply to
other witnesses (cf. CPLR Sec. 4513)." 75 Misc. 2d at 57, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 674 (dictum).
As noted by one commentator, the presence of the word "may" in CPLR 4513 tends to
support the contention that judicial discretion is permitted in determining the admissibility
of a witness' past criminal convictions. 5 WK&M 4513.10, at 3-315 to -316. But see
McLaughlin, Evidence, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 9, 1973, at 1, col. 1, at 4, col. 3, wherein Dean
McLaughlin stated that "CPLR 4513 appears to leave no room for discretion," id. at 4, col.
3, and suggested that CPLR 4513 be amended so as to make the rules in civil and criminal
proceedings uniform. Id.
72 See Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Luck involved § 305 of title
14 of the District of Columbia Code, which at the time provided in pertinent part:
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It is submitted that the Guarisco decision is questionable for
another and perhaps more significant reason. In reaching his conclu-
sion, Judge Cohen appears to have brushed aside the policy consid-
erations upon which Sandoval was premised .7 The Sandoval court
indicated that proof of prior crimes could result in a conviction
unfairly based on the impression that a witness-defendant possesses
No person shall be incompetent to testify, in either civil or criminal proceed-
ings, by reason of his having been convicted of [a] crime, but such fact may be
given in evidence to affect his credit as a witness, either upon the cross-examination
of the witness or by evidence aliunde; and the party cross-examining shall not be
concluded by his answers as to such matters.
Pub. L. No. 88-241, § 1, 77 Stat. 519 (1963) (amended by D.C. CODE § 14-305 (1973)). With
respect to the question of whether this statute permits the exercise of judicial discretion, the
court in Luck stated:
Section 305 is not written in mandatory terms. It says, in effect, that the conviction
"may," as opposed to "shall," be admitted; and we think the choice of words in
this instance is significant. The trial court is not required to allow impeachment
by prior conviction every time a defendant takes the stand in his own defense. The
statute, in our view, leaves room for the operation of a sound judicial discretion to
play upon the circumstances as they unfold in a particular case.
348 F.2d at 767-68 (footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court of California, in interpreting § 788 of the California Evidence Code,
reached a result similar to that of the Luck court. Section 788 of the California Evidence Code
provides in pertinent part:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, it may be shown by the
examination of the witness or by the record of the judgment that he has been
convicted of a felony ....
CAL. EvID. CODE § 788 (West 1966). The court found that the statute permitted discretion
concerning the admissibility of a witness' prior convictions. This conclusion was based on the
same rationale employed in Luck, i.e., the legislature's use of "may" rather than "shall."
People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 452, 492 P.2d 1, 7, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 319 (1972).
There seems to be a discernible trend toward the codification of judicial discretion in this
area. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a). Broad discretion is afforded the judiciary by Uniform Rule of
Evidence 609, which provides:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted but only if the
crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the
law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant,
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if
a period of more than ten years had elapsed since the date of the conviction or of
the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, which-
ever is the later date.
UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED (1975). Although the Uniform Rules were promulgated as recently
as 1974, at least three states already have adopted them. See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 285 (1976).
It is interesting to note that a 1973 Conference of New York Civil Court Judges voted
almost unanimously in favor of permitting judicial discretion over the admissibility of prior
convictions. See McLaughlin, Evidence, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 9, 1973, at 1, col.1, at 4, col. 3.
"3 See 90 Misc. 2d at 82, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
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a propensity toward committing the alleged act.7 4 While the inter-
ests at stake in a civil action often are less momentous than the
possible loss of liberty facing a criminal defendant, it would seem
that the rights of a party in a civil suit also may be unfairly preju-
diced by the suggestion that he has a propensity toward certain
criminal activity. The facts of Guarisco are particularly illustrative
of such a possibility. After the introduction of Guarisco's 20-year-
old conviction, a jury might conclude that a propensity existed to-
ward criminal activity, particularly theft. From this conclusion it
might be inferred that defendant had probable cause to believe that
Guarisco was shoplifting, thereby undermining one of plaintiff's
causes of action.75 Such a result would appear harsh, especially in
view of the number of years which had passed since plaintiff's crimi-
nal conviction.
New York courts traditionally have adhered to the common law
doctrine allowing a trial judge broad discretion in establishing the
permissible scope of cross-examination. As recognized in
Sandoval, the exercise of such discretion can aid in preventing un-
fair prejudice to a party witness.7 The Guarisco holding appears to
be an abrupt departure from this wise policy, and as such, opens the
door to possible unfair prejudice in civil actions. It is hoped that
future decisions will reject the Guarisco rationale and read CPLR
4513 as permitting the exercise of sound judicial discretion.
CPLR 4519: Dead Man's Statute held not to bar testimony of
potential distributee concerning pedigree declarations made by
intestate.
Designed to protect decedents' estates from fabricated claims
and perjured testimony, CPLR 4519, New York's "Dead Man's
Statute," renders an interested witness" incompetent to testify in
11 34 N.Y.2d at 376, 314 N.E.2d at 417, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 854; accord, People v. Schwartz-
man, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 247, 247 N.E.2d 642, 646, 299 N.Y.S.2d 817, 823, cert. denied, 396 U.S.
846 (1969).
11 In order to establish a cause of action in malicious prosecution, plaintiff must demon-
strate that defendant acted without probable cause in initiating the prosecution. See W.
PROSSER, LAW OF To'rs § 119, at 841 (4th ed. 1971).
78 See Langley v. Wadsworth, 99 N.Y. 61, 1 N.E. 106 (1885); McQuage v. City of New
York, 285 App. Div. 249, 136 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1st Dep't 1954).
34 N.Y.2d at 375, 314 N.E.2d at 416, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 853-54.
" CPLR 4519 provides in pertinent part:
Upon the trial of an action or the hearing upon the merits of a special proceed-
ing, a party or a person interested in the event . . . shall not be examined as a
witness in his own behalf or interest . . . against the executor, administrator or
survivor of a deceased person . . .or a person deriving his title or interest from,
through or under a deceased person. . . by assignment or otherwise, concerning a
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